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Abstract
We model a corporate firm in a competitive market setting, consisting of a produc-
tion technology, a hierarchical organization structure, a cost efficiency parameter, and an
internal pay-system. The depth of the firm determines its output and is set by profit max-
imization under the participation restriction that wages meet reservation wages. Reser-
vation wages are endogenously determined in the corporate market economy. We present
conditions guaranteeing a finite optimal firm size. Using CES-production technologies we
illustrate how firm size depends on labor substitutability, and show that a linear technology
yields the deepest organization structure, and complementarity between workers yields the
flattest structure.
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This paper addresses the entrepreneurial problem of determining endogenously the optimal
size of a firm in a competitive market environment, when the production possibilities interact
with the labor organization and the governance of the firm. It has been observed by Rajan
and Zingales (2001) that at the root of most enterprizes generating economic surplus is an
entrepreneur with a unique critical resource such as an idea, good customer relationships,
a new tool, or superior management technique. We represent this unique resource by two
concepts: a production outcome function specifying the various production possibilities from
which one to select, and the firm’s organization, specifying the management of transactions
and agency relations in the firm when realizing the chosen production technology. The firm’s
organization — to be determined by the entrepreneur — specifies roles or positions within
the firm and the agency relations connecting these roles and positions. Given the pay-
system and the market prices, the entrepreneur adapts the organization to the technology
and so determines the size of the firm. The interaction between technology and organization
determines the productivity of the workers’ positions in the organization. Such a firm is
called a ‘corporate firm’.
We follow the seminal paper of Alchian and Demsetz (1972) who state that production is
in principle a collective effort, see also Hart and Moore (1990) and Ichiishi (1993). Therefore
we use a cooperative game theoretic model in which teams of workers can generate a specific
level of production when they are coordinated by their respective managers. The technology is
a set of production outcome functions, defined on the set of front-workers in the organization
for each level of production. The chosen level of production determines the size of the firm.
The firm’s organization is described by a network of principal-agent relations between the
labor positions in the firm. The top-position or the CEO of the firm — having no principal in
the firm — chooses the structure and the size of the organization such that it maximizes profit
given external prices and an internal pay-system. The network of principal-agent relations
is a hierarchy represented by a tree. The front-positions in the firm — having no agent as
successor in the firm — interact with customers and generate the added value of the firm.
These front-positions enter the firm’s production function as inputs. The positions between
the top and the front workers, the middle-management, facilitate the productivity of the
front-workers. Each middle-manager or coordinator is a principal for some other agents at
a lower level, and translates, monitors, and adapts the various tasks and responsibilities
of its subordinates in order to let them comply with the overall mission of the firm. This
mission is given by the CEO or top-principal, who aims at profit maximization1. Increasing
the number of levels broadens the productive base of the firm but also increases the level-
1Although not written down explicitly here, this mission may be reformulated to subgoals down in the
firm organization and how, in the upward direction, information about production and sales is communicated
and translated in operational terms for higher levels in the firm organization. See Radner (1992) for a survey
about the information processing and decentralized decision making in hierarchical firms.
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dependent agency costs. These costs are increasing in the number of hierarchical levels.
Examples of such costs are the translation of the central strategic mission to each operational
level, or the agency costs involved in the processing and control of level-dependent budgets
and information, implying a loss of control of a coordinator over the behavior of its direct
subordinates, see, e.g. Williamson (1967). These agency costs are expressed by a discount
factor between 0 and 1, which indicates the percentage loss of output for each level involved.
The exogenously given pay-system assigns payments to all positions in the firm. It is
a function distributing the value added of the firm between the profit for the owner posi-
tion and the different wages for the employee positions in the firm. We use a cooperative
distribution function which implies that all positions earn a share in the value added that
can be generated by different compositions of actively occupied positions in the firm. This
distribution function satisfies three axioms that resemble conditions used in collective wage
agreements. Since the wages and profit are assigned to the positions in the firm, and not
directly to the employees who occupy these positions, we call them positional wages and
positional profit . The endogenous determination of these positional wages is a novelty that
distinguishes our approach from the models that follow the seminal papers of, for example,
Williamson (1967) and Keren and Levhari (1979, 1983), where the wages of the workers are
fixed and independent of the firm structure.
On the labor market, potential employees are offered positional wages for the various
positions in the firm. If an employee accepts an offer, he is admitted to a position in the
organization and voluntarily subjects himself to the hierarchy of the firm, see, e.g., Coleman
(1980), Rosen (1982), and Simon (1991). If some positional wage falls below the reservation
wage that position will not be occupied. The goal of the firm’s CEO is to maximize profit given
the workers’ participation constraint. If maximal profit falls below the external reservation
profit then the owner will not activate the firm. In principle, the profit maximizing owner
may be forced to pay a position wage to an employee higher than the market wage if the
pay-system assigns that wage according to his or her internal productivity2.
In order to endogenize the reservation wages and reservation profit, we introduce a general
equilibrium framework, called a corporate market economy, which consists of a representative
firm as described above, a finite set of consumers and a finite set of competitive markets3.
The firm demands labor and supplies the goods or services produced, while the consumers
demand these goods or services and supply labor. So wages and prices interact with the
optimal size of firms. The firm’s supply and demand is determined by the optimal level of
the organization, as set by the entrepreneur. Market supply of the consumption good and
2The idea that wages may be higher than reservation wages also appears in efficiency wage theory , see e.g.,
Stiglitz (1976), Akerlof (1984) and Yellen (1984).
3This context implies that the corporate firm’s outcome is marketable. The corporate firm can also be
interpreted as a non-profit or public firm. In that case, the general equilibrium framework will be much more
complex.
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market demand for labor then is determined by assuming a representative firm. Assuming
consumer preferences to satisfy the standard regularity conditions, aggregation of individual
demand and supply yields market demand for the consumption good and market supply
of labor. A corporate market equilibrium consists of an output price, a wage and a firm
size, such that (i) firm size is optimal given the prices, and (ii) the prices are competitive
equilibrium prices at which market supply equals market demand given the firm size. In
other words, in a corporate market equilibrium the external competitive equilibrium prices
are consistent with the firms’ internal equilibrium (i.e. profit maximizing size). In general
there may arise discontinuities in the firms supply and demand functions. As a consequence,
a corporate market equilibrium need not exist. However, such an equilibrium exists if the
optimal firm size is continuous in prices. This is the case for certain production technologies,
such as linear and Cobb-Douglas technologies. We show the effect of a change in technology
on the firm’s organization and on positional wages.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the model of a corporate firm is introduced.
In Section 3 we provide conditions under which an optimal firm size exists, i.e. when its level
is finite. In Section 4 we discuss some special cases using constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) production technologies. We show that in case working labor is substitutable (i.e. there
are no complementarities), for reasonable values of the effectiveness parameters the owner
will choose the deepest organization structure restricted by the reservation wage of workers.
An opposite result is derived for Cobb-Douglas production technologies with indispensable
labor, in which case the flattest organization is chosen. In Section 5 we discuss the feature
that the optimal firm size might depend discontinuously on the market prices, and discuss
the consequences for a corporate market economy, in particular with respect to non-existence
of equilibria. Finally, in Section 6 we describe related literature and give some concluding
remarks.
2 The corporate firm
In this section we introduce the constitutional elements of the firm: the technology, the
internal organization, the agency costs and the pay-system.
2.1 The technology: outcome possibilities
For every level n of the organization, the set of employees of a firm, Nn, is partitioned
in a set of front-workers, Wn, and a set of managers or coordinators, Mn (including the
unique owner or CEO). The firm’s technology is described by a set of (production) outcome
functions defined on the power set of front-workers, fn: 2
Wn → R, which set follows from
the decision made by the owner. This set contains all coalitions of front-workers, where a
coalition is defined as a group of workers who interact only with members of their group. So,
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for some activity all external effects are internalized in that coalition. In order to simplify
the analysis, we assume that all front-workers are homogeneous meaning that they have
identical roles in the production process. So, the firm’s outcome function can be reduced to
fn: {1, . . . , |Wn|} → R, defined on the number of (identical) front-workers. We further assume
that the outcome function is monotone implying that f(k) ≤ f(l) if k ≤ l. An important
subclass of monotone outcome functions is the class of supermodular outcome functions (see.
e.g. Milgrom and Roberts (1994)) which exhibit increasing scale returns in the sense that
they favor producing with larger sets of front-workers. Moreover, we assume that nothing is
produced if no worker is providing any labor input, i.e., f(0) = 0.
As mentioned above, we parameterize the size of a firm by the variable n. The exact
meaning of this variable is to be specified in the next subsection. So, the set of outcome
functions at the disposal of the entrepreneur is defined by {fn | n = 1, . . . , n}, with n
sufficiently large. The outcome provided by the firm is sold at a competitive output price
p > 0. Thus, if all front-workers are active, then the transaction value is the firm’s outcome
multiplied by the (market) price and is equal to pfn(|Wn|).
2.2 The internal organization of the firm
A service cannot be rendered by the front-workers unless it is managed and facilitated by
the middle-management. The main tool of management for the entrepreneur is the internal
organization structure of the firm. It may be seen as the institutional hull that realizes
and supports, but also constraints the technology, represented here by the set of outcome
functions. The organization of a firm determines tasks, competencies, and incentives for
the various roles in a firm such that the expected performance of the middle management
optimally supports the productivity of the front-workers, in order to maximize the firm’s
value-added.
For any given value of the level n, the firm’s governance is described by a hierarchical
network (Nn, Sn) of principal-agent relations, in which the set of nodes, Nn, represents a set
of well defined roles4 or labor position in the firm, and the structure Sn:Nn → Nn represents
the set of principal-agent relations, in short agency relations, where (i, j) with j ∈ Sn(i),
is an agency relation with principal i and agent j if There is a unique position having no
principal, called the top position, i0, which will be occupied by the owner or CEO of the firm.
Each agent has one principal, so there is no cycle in the graph. It follows that the internal
organization structure (Nn, Sn) has a tree structure, its root being the top-position i0, and
the end-points forming a nonempty set of positions having no agents. This set corresponds
with the set of front-positions in the firm: Wn = {i ∈ Nn | Sn(i) = ∅}. The labor input of
the production process is provided by the workers occupying the front-positions. Obviously,
4The model is therefore a role assignment model as introduced by Everett and Borgatti (1991), see also
Pekec and Roberts (2001).
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a firm with structure (Nn, Sn) can produce according to a production outcome function fn
if and only if the set of front-positions in the structure Wn corresponds to the domain of
the outcome function. The other positions, i.e. the ones in the set Mn = Nn \Wn, are the
coordinator positions (including the top-position i0) which serve to increase the productivity
of the front-positions.
Since the internal organization structure has a hierarchical tree structure, different eche-
lons can be distinguished in the internal organization, where each position in a given echelon
has the same distance to the top-position. Let N0 = {i0} represent the top-echelon with the
owner-position of the firm. Then, recursively we define the sets Nℓ = Nℓ−1∪{i ∈ Nn \Nℓ−1 |
i ∈ Sn(j) for some j ∈ Nℓ−1}, for ℓ = 1, . . . , n. So, the sets Lℓ = Nℓ \Nℓ−1, ℓ = 1, . . . , n, form
the different hierarchical echelons in the firm. Additional structure is required to guarantee
that the lowest echelon Nn \ Nn−1 is equal to the set of positions having no agent. This
is obtained by assuming that each principal in the firm has the same number of agents5.
This number is called the span of control6 and is denoted by s. So |Sn(i)| = s for all
i ∈Mn = Nn \Wn. Given the top-echelon L0 = N0, the positions at some echelon, ℓ, of the
firm are represented by Lℓ = {iℓ,1, . . . , iℓ,sℓ}, for ℓ = 1, . . . , n. Denoting the top-position i0
alternatively by i0,1 as the first position in echelon 0, the corresponding relational structure
is Sn(il,k) = {il+1,(k−1)s+1, . . . , il+1,ks}, l = 0, . . . , n − 1 and k = 1, . . . , s
l. We refer to the
number of echelons n as the level of the firm. In Figure 1 the internal organization structure
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Figure 1: A one-level and a two-level internal organization structure with span of control 2





(s−1) , the number





s−1 , and the number of front-positions
5We can allow for firms with a non-uniform span of control and front-positions in different echelons. However
for notational convenience we do not allow for such firms in this paper.
6Since the workers have to be coordinated, their number is not arbitrary and depends on the size of
the internal organization structure. The simplifying assumption that the span of control is equal for each
coordinator can only be made if the workers are homogeneous and, for each echelon in the firm, the coordinators
are identical. Between echelons their capacities and tasks will differ. In such a firm the number of echelons
completely determines the structure of the firm.
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is equal to |Wn| = sn. The coordination intensity 7 equals the ratio |Mn|/|Wn| and is
approximately equal to 1/(s− 1), if n is large enough.
2.3 Agency costs
The sequence of agency relations decentralizes decision making at each consecutive echelon
and allows to decrease the complexity of the decision problem at each echelon. It results,
however, in certain level-dependent agency costs. These agency costs per echelon are stated
as a percentage of final production and are represented by (1 − α), with the parameter α
strictly between zero and one. Agency costs are therefore increasing in the level of the firm.
Increasing the level (i.e. adding an echelon) in the firm structure may thus benefit the owner
by increasing the scale of production, at the cost of an increase in agency costs.
The owner of the firm gives the workers access to the production technology by allowing
the workers to occupy these positions. As we have seen, if all positions are effectively occupied
then a transaction value equal to pfn(|Wn|) = pfn(s
n) is generated. Net revenue or value
added is obtained by subtracting the level-dependent cost from this gross revenue8 yielding
pαnfn(s
n). Note that the parameter α can be seen as an agency efficiency parameter. It
may correlate with the span of control parameter s, but both are given here.
2.4 The pay-system
The pay-system distributes the value added of a firm among the worker and owner positions.
We assume that all capital costs are incurred by the owner. The pay-system must be equally
applicable to any organization of a firm. So, the pay-system is a function ϕ which assigns
a distribution of value added to every cooperative outcome function fn with internal orga-
nization structure (Nn, Sn) and level-dependent agency efficiency parameter α. Since the
internal organization structure and level dependent agency efficiency are determined by the
level n, we denote the reward assigned to position i ∈ Nn in a firm producing according to fn
by ϕi(fn). This pay-system determines the wages that eventually are paid to the employees
occupying the coordinator and front-positions. Since the rewards are assigned to and depend
on the positions in the firm structure we refer to these wages as positional wages. Similarly,
we refer to the profit as positional profit .
We assume this pay-system to satisfy the following three properties. First, it guarantees
a balanced budget9, i.e.,
∑
i∈Nn ϕi(fn) = pα
nfn(s
n) for every firm level n and outcome
function fn. Second, it satisfies vertical monotonicity meaning that a supervisor does not
receive a lower wage than its successors, i.e., for every firm level n and every monotone
7This concept is introduced by Gordon (1994) in order to estimate and explain differences in the span of
control over various countries.
8For notational convenience we do not consider material cost that depend on the level of production.
Considering these costs to have given input price c > 0 does not change the results.
9In game theory this property is called efficiency .
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outcome function fn, it holds that ϕi(fn) ≥ ϕj(fn) for all i ∈ Mn and j ∈ Sn(i). Finally,
we assume the pay-system to be symmetric meaning that in a homogeneous firm it assigns
the same positional wage to all positions within the same coordination or worker level. For
a homogeneous firm this last property implies that we can speak about wages assigned to
echelons instead of wages assigned to positions, i.e., ϕk(fn) = ϕi(fn) for all i ∈ Nk, k ∈
{1, . . . , n}. Similarly, the profit of the owner position is denoted by ϕ0(fn).
Now we can define an n-level corporate firm as a tuple Fn = (fn, (Nn, Sn), α, ϕ) with:
1. a monotone outcome function fn defined on a set Wn,
2. an internal organization structure (Nn, Sn) having a tree structure with a constant span
of control s and level n on the non-empty and finite set of positions Nn such that the
set of front-positions {i ∈ Nn | Sn(i) = ∅} corresponds to Wn,
3. an agency efficiency parameter 0 < α < 1,
4. a pay-system ϕ that yields a distribution of value added in positional wages and profit
satisfying budget neutrality, vertical monotonicity and symmetry.
In order to endogenously determine the optimal firm level we need to define the corporate
firm with a variable number of levels, i.e. we need to describe how the firm looks like for
every possible size.
Definition 2.1 A corporate firm is a set F = {Fn}n∈N with Fn = (fn, (Nn, Sn), α, ϕ) being
an n-level corporate firm for every n ∈ N.
3 The optimal size of the corporate firm
Since the profit of a corporate firm depends on the firm level, the owner can determine profit
by choosing this level. Given the span of control, the only way to increase the number of
front-positions in the firm is to increase its level. An extra echelon allows more workers to be
active. It has a positive effect on value added through the monotone outcome function. On
the other hand, there is the negative effect of the level dependent agency cost. The owner of
the firm chooses level n in order to maximize profit.
Suppose that the owner can choose a firm level between 1 and n without any constraints.
In that case the maximal profit equals ϕ0(n) = max{ϕ0(fn) | n ∈ {1, . . . , n}} with ϕ0(0) = 0.
Thus, by ϕ0 we have written profit as a non-decreasing function of maximal possible firm
level n. We call ϕ0 the level-dependent profit function, see Figure 2. (In the figures we assume
for simplicity that the level n can be any non-negative real number n ∈ R+.)
Besides the unit output price p > 0, the external organization of the firm is represented
by a reservation wage w > 0 for workers, and a reservation profit π > 0 for the owner.













Figure 2: Profit ϕ0 and level dependent-profit ϕ0 for the owner as function of firm level
by employees (i.e. front-workers and coordinators). The potential employees of a firm will
accept a position in a firm with level n if and only if the positional wages offered do not
fall below their reservation wage w. Therefore, in optimum the owner chooses firm level n
such that profit is maximal under the constraint that the positional wages offered to the
workers10 do not fall below their reservation wage. If profit at this level is lower than the
reservation profit, then the owner will not activate the firm. So, the only firm levels that
are supported by the external environment of the firm are the ones in the set N(w, π, p) =
No(w, p) ∩No(π, p), where No(w, p) = {n ∈ N | ϕn(fn) ≥ w} is the set of levels that satisfy
the worker participation constraint , and No(π, p) = {n ∈ N | ϕ0(fn) ≥ π} is the set of
levels that satisfy the owner participation constraint . In general, the set N(w,π, p) can be
empty, disconnected or unbounded. The optimal coordination level n∗ is the lowest level of
coordination that maximizes profit under the worker and owner participation constraints.
Definition 3.1 The optimal firm level of a corporate firm F , given reservation wage w,
reservation profit π and output price p, is the level
n∗(w, π, p) = min{n ∈ N(w,π, p) | ϕ0(fn) = max
n̂∈N(w,π,p)
ϕ0(fn̂)},
if there exists n ∈ N(w, π, p) with ϕ0(fn) ≥ 0, and n∗(w,π, p) = 0 otherwise.
The following proposition gives sufficient conditions for the existence of a finite optimal
firm level. We say that average labor productivity is non-increasing in firm level if there is a
level ñ such that fn+1(s
n+1) ≤ sfn(s
n) for all n ≥ ñ.11
10We implicitly assume that the labor market is compartmentalized into homogeneous levels and is suffi-
ciently differentiated to provide for each hierarchical level a competitive partial labor market. Any level may
be chosen as a benchmark. We have chosen the lowest level. This assumption allows us to compare only the
lowest wage offered by the firm with the reservation wage of the corresponding compartment on the labor
market since vertical monotonicity of the pay-system implies that the wage offered to a coordinator is always
greater or equal to the wages offered to its subordinate workers. Thus, if the workers accept the wages offered
then also the coordinators accept the wages offered to them.
11The more strict property of strongly non-increasing average labor productivity requires that this inequality
holds for all n ≥ 1. For our result this is not necessary.
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Proposition 3.2 (Existence of a finite optimal firm level) For every corporate firm F
with non-increasing average labor productivity in firm level, and for every triple of prices
(w,π, p), the set N(w,π, p) of firm levels that are supported by the external environment is
bounded, and thus a finite optimal firm level exists.
Proof
First, suppose that average labor productivity is non-increasing in firm level n ≥ 0. Then
there exists a constant c ∈ R+ such that fn(s
n) ≤ csn, and thus total value added of a firm
with level n satisfies pαnfn(s
n) ≤ pc(αs)n. Since the number of positions in an n level firm
equals |Nn| =
sn+1−1
s−1 , efficiency, vertical monotonicity and symmetry of the pay-system ϕ








n. So, for α < 1 it holds
that limn→∞ ϕn(fn) = 0. But then {n ∈ N | ϕn(fn) ≥ w} is bounded for w > 0, and so is
N(w,π, p) ⊂ {n ∈ N | ϕn(fn) ≥ w}.
Next, suppose that there exists a ñ ∈ N such that average labor productivity is non-
increasing in firm size n ≥ ñ. Then there exists a constant c ∈ R+ such that for n ≥ ñ, it
holds that fn(s
n) − fñ(s





ñ)) ≤ pαncsn−ñ = pc(αs)
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α < 1 it holds that limn→∞ ϕn(fn) = 0, and thus {n ∈ N | ϕn(fn) ≥ w} is bounded for
w > 0, and so is N(w, π, p).
This immediately yields that the optimal firm level is finite. 
Note that without a finite optimal firm level our model would not be suitable. In Propo-
sition 3.2 we stated conditions under which the set N(w,π, p) is bounded. However, it can












Figure 3: N(w,π, p) = ∅ but disconnected.
4 The effect of technological change on firm level
We have simplified the corporate firm by assuming that the production outcome function is













Figure 4: N(w, π, p) = ∅.
technologies and allows us to analyze the effects of a change in technology. We start with a
linear technology in which all front-workers are substitutes, and thus there are no comple-
mentarities between labor inputs. Then a Cobb-Douglas technology is analyzed, implying
complementarity between individual front-workers. Finally, we discuss the more general case
of constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production technologies. In order to analyze these
cases, we have to specify the pay-system for the corporate firm.
4.1 The position pay-system
A particular specification of the pay-system is the position pay-system12, which distributes
the value added of the corporate firm among all positions in the organization. According
to this position pay-system the distribution of value added among the owner (as profit) and
the employee positions (as wages) depends on the value added that can be generated by all
subsets of front-positions E ⊂Wn, i.e., all values v
fn(E) = pαnfn(|E|) for E ⊂ Nn.
Given these values, we define the dividends of subsets of front-positions, recursively, by




∆fn(F ), otherwise. These
dividends thus can be seen as the net-productivity of the subsets E ⊂Wn, i.e. the dividend
∆fn(E) represents the contribution to value added that is generated by E and was not
already generated by the subsets of E. Note that these dividends can be negative, even for
supermodular outcome functions. For a discussion of these dividends we refer to Harsanyi
(1959).
Now, the position pay-system ϕ̃ distributes the dividend of a set of front-positions E
equally among the front-positions in E and their superior positions13. Motivations for using
12Game theoretically, this position pay-system is obtained by applying the permission value as developed
by Gilles, Owen and van den Brink (1992), van den Brink and Gilles (1996) and van den Brink (1997) to a
restricted production game as done in van den Brink (1996). As such it is related to the Shapley value for
cooperative TU-games and the Nash Bargaining solution for bargaining problems. We remark that it is not
based on the position value for games with limited communication as introduced in Borm, Owen and Tijs
(1992).






, for all i ∈ Nn,
where for every i ∈ Nn we have j ∈ Ŝn(i) if and only if i = j or there exists a sequence of positions (h1, . . . , ht)
such that h1 = i, hk+1 ∈ S(hk) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ t− 1 and ht = j.
12
the position pay-system can be found in van den Brink (1996). Note that the position pay-
system is a consistent system in the sense that it can be applied to any firm irrespective of
the specific productivity of the workers, and thus it can be seen as a standard in collective
wage agreements.
It is easy to verify that the position pay-system satisfies symmetry, and thus the wages of
the worker positions at level n can be indicated by ϕ̃n(fn) = ϕ̃i(fn), for all i ∈Wn. The po-
sition pay-system also satisfies budget neutrality and structural monotonicity, so Proposition
3.2 is valid for ϕ̃.
In the previous section we also mentioned that the set N(w, π, p) of firm levels that are
supported by the external environment of a firm can be empty. For firms with supermodular
outcome functions and the position pay-system, sufficient conditions for the existence of a
positive optimal level in N(w,π, p) follow from the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1 Let F be a corporate firm with the position pay-system ϕ̃ and supermodular
outcome functions {fn | n ∈ N}. If productivity meets reservation prices in the sense that
vf1(W1)
2s ≥ w and
vf1 (W1)
s+1 ≥ π for every w,π, p > 0, then the set N(w,π, p) is nonempty.
Proof
In van den Brink (1996) it is shown that for supermodular outcome functions with identical
workers it holds that 1 ≤ ϕ̃i(fn)
ϕ̃j(fn)
≤ s for i ∈ Mn, j ∈ Sn(i), n ∈ N. Applying this result to








(ii) ϕ̃0(f1) = v





It follows that under some reasonable conditions the position pay-system allows the owner
to activate the corporate firm.
4.2 Degrees in complementarity between front-workers
In this section we consider firms with a specific production technology. We first consider two
types of well-known and widely applied constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production
technologies, namely linear and Cobb-Douglas technologies.
4.2.1 Linear outcome functions: no complementarity
We first consider a linear production technology with outcome function f1n(k) = k. In this
case, which coincides with Williamson (1967), the labor inputs are perfect substitutes. Al-
though for firms with different size the domain of the outcome function is different, the
13
production technology is the same for all levels of coordination, i.e. the firm produces ac-
cording to a linear production technology for every size n. The value added of a firm with
front-positions E ⊂Wn occupied then is given by
vf
1
n(E) = pαn|E| for all E ⊂Wn,
with dividends equal to ∆v
f1n (E) = pαn if |E| = 1, and ∆v
f1n (E) = 0 otherwise. Profit







The workers will only accept the positions offered to them if the corresponding position wages








Assume for simplicity that the level n can be any non-negative real number n ∈ R+. The













Figure 5: Profit and wages for a linear production technology.
For the moment we ignore the owner participation constraint. Clearly, in this case the
set N(w, 0, p) = [0, n(w)] is connected and bounded from above by the reservation wage level
n(w) defined as the firm level above which the wage of workers is lower than their reservation
wage, i.e.,









The optimal level of the firm is determined by maximizing profit (see equation (1)) of the














and then increases monotonically (see the left picture in Figure 5)15. This implies that from
the critical level nc(p), being the minimal size for which profit is at least as high as profit for a
firm of level 1, there is no limit to the firm level from the point of view of the owner, and thus
the owner will try to expand the firm level as high as possible due to its profit maximizing
behavior. The owner, however, is restricted in this ambition by the labor market, i.e., the
optimal firm level n∗ should be an element of N(w, 0, p) = [0, n(w)].
Next we discuss how the optimal level n∗ looks like. If profit at the reservation wage level




1 )) then the reservation wage level
n(w) exceeds the critical level nc(w, p). In that case the owner will set the level of the firm
equal to the reservation level n(w) and, implicitly, will reduce the wage of the workers as
close to their reservation wage as possible. Thus, it are the workers who determine the level
of the firm.
However, if profit at the reservation wage level n(w) does not exceed profit at level one
(i.e. if ϕ̃0(f1n(w)) ≤ ϕ̃0(f
1
1 )), and thus n(w) ≤ n
c(w, p), then coordination is not profitable.
If wages at level one are at least equal to the reservation wage (i.e. if ϕ̃n(f11 ) ≥ w) then the
firm will have only one hierarchical level with no intermediate coordinators. Otherwise, if
ϕ̃n(f11 ) < w, the firm will not be active.
Above we ignored the participation constraint of the owner. Also considering that con-










Note that n̆ = 1ln(αs) − 1 ≤ 1 if and only if αs ≥ e
1
2 ≃ 1.65. Thus, if αs ≥ e
1
2 ≃ 1.65 then
profit of the owner attains its minimum at n̆ ≤ 1 and profits are monotonically increasing in
n ≥ 1. In this case the owner will always push the workers to their reservation wages, and
set the level of the firm equal to n(w). For s = 2 this means that ϕ̃0 is increasing in n for
α ≥ 12e
1
2 ≃ 0.825. For s > 2 this is even the case for lower values of α. Williamson (1967)
argues that α mostly will be in the neighborhood of 0.9. So, we might expect profit to be
increasing in n, and the level of the firm to be determined by the reservation wages of the
workers.
Proposition 4.2 (Linear outcome functions) Consider a firm with a linear production
technology and the position pay-system. If an optimal firm level exists and α ≥ 12e
1
2 , then
profit is monotonically increasing in firm level n ≥ 1, and the owner will choose the deepest
organization structure n∗ = n(w), which level is bounded above by the reservation wage of the
workers.







= 0, so n =
1
ln(αs) − 1. It may be noticed that αs > 0, otherwise there would be no reason to expand. For n =
1
ln(αs) − 1,











yields n̆ given by (4).
15





∗+1 − 1)/(s− 1) with n∗ = n(w).
As mentioned above, the condition α ≥ 12e
1
2 can be weakened to αs ≥ e
1
2 . If an optimal
firm level exists but αs < 1.65 then the owner chooses the deepest organization n∗ = n(w)
only if at that level the profit exceeds the profit of a one-level firm. Otherwise the flattest
organization structure n∗ = 1 is chosen. Finally, the firm is inactive if there does not exist
an optimal firm level.
Example 4.3 We first consider an example where the values for the parameters are as
suggested by Williamson (1967). He argues that the normal range for s is between 5 and 10.













Table 1: ρ = 1, s = 6, α = 0.9, p = 1
Since n̆ < 1, profit is increasing from level 1 onwards, and thus the critical level nc(p)
equals 1. From the table it follows that if, for example, w = π = 0.15 then the critical level
nc(0.15, 1) equals 1, and the optimal firm level is equal to 3, and the workers are pushed to
their reservation wages. 
Example 4.4 Next we give an example with agency cost so high that αs < 1.65. Let















Table 2: ρ = 1, s = 2, α = 0.7, p = 1
Thus, the profit of the firm is minimal for n̆ = 2. The critical level equals 4. If, for
example, w = π = 0.15 then the workers will only accept a position in a firm with level
n ≤ 2. In that case the owners will form the flattest hierarchical structure, and thus the firm
will have one level.
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If the reservation wage is low enough, for example, w = 0.03, then the owners of the firm
will push the workers to their reservation wages and set firm level equal to 4. 
4.2.2 Cobb-Douglas outcome functions: full complementarity
Next we consider the case of a Cobb-Douglas production technology in which front-workers
are homogeneous, but each worker is indispensable in the group. The Cobb-Douglas outcome
function f0n: {1, . . . , s




n−k which equals sn if k = sn,
and equals 0 otherwise. (Note that we normalized production such that the fully employed
firm produces f0n(s
n) = sn, and thus average labor productivity is the same as in the linear





p(αs)n if E ⊃Wn
0 else,
i.e., if all positions in the n-level firm are occupied then value added equals p(αs)n, while value
added equals zero if at least one position is not occupied. This reflects the indispensability
of the working labor inputs. In this case the only non-zero dividend is that of the set of all
workers and equals ∆v
f0n (Wn) = p(αs)n. According to the position pay-system, profit and













For fixed α and n the wage of the workers is higher as compared to the linear production case.
Again assume for simplicity that the level n can be any non-negative real number n ∈ R+.
Then, profit and wages are decreasing in the number of hierarchical levels16. It follows that
the owner sets firm level n not higher than 1, the flattest possible structure. The workers
accept the positions in the firm if and only if pαs(s−1)s2−1 ≥ w. In this case it are the owners
of the firm who determine the firm level n = 1. For the individual workers who occupy a
position in the firm this is the best possible structure.
Proposition 4.5 (Cobb-Douglas outcome function) Consider a firm with Cobb-Douglas
production technology and the position pay-system. If an optimal firm level exists, then the
owner will choose the flattest organizational structure at level n∗ = 1.
In this case of full complementarity between front-workers, employment in the firm is equal
to |Nn∗ | = s+ 1.





n). Clearly, profit is decreasing in firm level, and a finite critical level does not exist.























Table 3: ρ→ 0, s = 2, α = 0.7, p = 1
4.2.3 The effect of a change in technology on a corporate firm
We have analyzed two types of corporate firms, both adapting the position pay-system and
both endowed with a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production technology: the
linear and Cobb-Douglas production technologies. These are two extreme benchmark cases
with perfectly substitutable labor inputs in the linear production technology and indispens-
able labor inputs in the Cobb-Douglas technology. We have seen that the difference between
profit and worker wages in the linear technology firm is higher than in the Cobb-Douglas
firm (where they are equal). As a consequence, the Cobb-Douglas firm will have at most one
level while in the linear firm, for reasonable values of the efficiency parameter α, the firm
will have its deepest firm level restricted by the reservation wage of workers. In a more gen-
eral setting we could consider a firm with a homogeneous CES production outcome function
fρn: {1, . . . , s
n} → R+ given by
17 fρn(k) = γ
fρn(k)
1
ρ , 0 < ρ ≤ 1. Note that these are supermod-
ular production functions18. Value added is given by vf
ρ
n(E) = pαnfρn(|E|) for E ⊂Wn. The
linear production technology corresponds to ρ = 1 and γf
1
n = 1, whereas the Cobb-Douglas
technology corresponds to ρ→ 0 and γf
0
n = sn. In such a CES firm19 with complementarity
parameter ρ ∈ [0, 1], the optimal firm level is either one (as in the Cobb-Douglas case) or is
determined by the reservation wage level (as in the linear case).
Formally, the shift from a deep to a flat organization depends on the front-workers comple-
mentarity parameter ρ. For an intermediate degree of complementarity, the profit decreases
with n to a minimum, attained at n̆, and then increases. The value of n̆ (and thus the critical
level nc(w, p)) increases with complementarity (i.e. decreases with ρ). In the extreme case of







ρ , x ∈ Rm, γ ∈ R, ρ ∈ (−∞, 1].
18Since we assume the outcome function to be monotone ρ should be positive.
19Here we use the scale parameter γf
ρ
n as a normalization factor in order to keep labor productivity per
worker constant for different number of levels n, (and thus assuming labor productivity per worker to be
independent of firm size). These firms satisfy the conditions of Proposition 3.2, and thus have a finite optimal
firm level. An advantage of constant labor productivity is that the optimal firm level is not influenced by
changes in labor productivity, but is determined by the distribution of the value added among the owner (as
profit) and the employee positions (as positional wages).
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a Cobb-Douglas production technology this minimum is infinite. Moreover, for fixed α and
n the position-wage of a worker lies between the low position-wage in the linear production
firm with a deep organization, and the high position-wage in the Cobb-Douglas firm with a
flat organization20.
This might explain the differences we observe in positional wages and firm levels. Although
firms don’t produce according to one particular homogeneous CES production technology,
we do observe that workers whose positions have a high degree of complementarity usually
get higher wages. For example, one of the front-positions in a hospital organization are
the surgeon positions. The generation of value by a hospital strongly depends on the tasks
assigned to the surgeon positions. Therefore we see that surgeon salaries are usually rather
high compared to the salaries of hospital top management. On the other hand, the quality
of the service provided by a desk office in, for example, a bank depends on the number
and quality of the front desk-workers. But even if one front-desk position falls out, still a
decent service can be delivered. In those organizations we usually see that top management
salaries are much higher than front-worker wages21. The model developed here explains these
differences, and consequently the difference in organizations. For example, there are usually
not so many firm levels between a surgeon and hospital management.
We also can explain a shift in the technology of a given corporate firm. Consider the
army. Its technology was clearly linear in the past, with a deep organizational structure. The
technological innovations have shifted the technology to a Cobb-Douglas type, changing the
army to a flatter organization with more equal and higher wages.
Not only the degree of substitutability of front-workers, but also the value of the parameter
α determines the value of n̆ (and thus of nc(w, p)). A low value of α (high agency costs) yields
a high value of n̆, and thus there is a wide range of production technologies for which firm
level is equal to 1, overruling the influence of the reservation wage of the workers on the firm
level. If α increases, i.e., agency costs decrease, then the critical value n̆ decreases, giving
the owners the opportunity to push the workers to their reservation wage. In that case firm
level, and thus employment, is influenced by the reservation wage of the workers.
Example 4.7 As an illustration of an intermediate case, consider ρ = 12 . Then the outcome
function is given by f
1/2
n (k) = γf
1/2
n k2, k ∈ {0, . . . , sn}. Since f
1/2
n (sn) = γf
1/2
n s2n, to keep
labor productivity equal to one, the normalization factor must be γf
1/2
n = 1sn . The value
added then is given by
vf
1/2





|E|2, for all E ⊂Wn.
20So, for high enough substitutability of the labor inputs the optimal firm level is determined by the
reservation wage level. Increasing complementarity will continuously decrease this reservation wage level up
to a certain degree of complementarity, after which a further increase in complementarity makes optimal firm
level discontinuously ‘jump’ to 1.
21Of course, also other features, such as the market or the quality and motivation of the workers, play a role
in the determination of wages, but the role of complementarity of labor is often neglected in the literature.
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Let s = 2, p = 1, and α = 0.7. In Table 4 we give some values for ϕ̃0(f
1/2
n ) and ϕ̃n(f
1/2
n ).














Table 4: ρ = 12 , s = 2, α = 0.7, p = 1
Thus, the profit of the firm is minimal for n = 3. The critical level equals 6. If w = π =
0.15 then the workers will only accept a position in a firm with level n ≤ 2. In that case the
owners will set firm level equal to 1 if the resevation profit π allows to do so. If, for example,
w = 0.015 then the owner of the firm will push the workers to their reservation wages and
set firm level equal to 6. Compared to Table 2 we see that the minimal profit is reached for
a higher value of n. 
5 Demand and supply in a corporate market economy
We finally define a market economy in which supply of consumer goods and demand for
labor is set by a representative corporate firm as defined in this paper. Consider the triple
E = (F,C,M), with a representative corporate firm F , a finite set of consumers C and a
finite set of competitive marketsM. Such a triple E is called a corporate market economy.
The internal equilibrium of the corporate firm is determined by the optimal level of its
organization, which is a function n:R3+ → R, where n(w,π, p) is the optimal firm level as
given in Definition 3.1 for the wage w, the rate of return on capital π and the output price
p. Here, the reservation prices in the previous sections are replaced by market prices, i.e. the
reservation wage is determined by the market wage, the reservation profit is determined by
the rate of return on capital and the output price is determined by the market price of the
consumption good.
From Section 2 we know that the demand for labor, dl, and the supply of commodities,
sc, are functions of market prices, dl(w,π, p) =
sn(w,π,p)+1−1
s−1 −1, and sc(w, π, p) = (αs)
n(w,π,p)
for any triple of market prices w,π and p. The capital needed for each active firm is equal
to 1. Market demand and supply is determined by assuming that all firms are identical. So
the firm is a representative firm in the industry, which may consist of more than one firm.
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The number of firms is set equal to the capital demanded on the market. Assuming market
supply of capital to be inelastic and given by k ∈ N, the number of firms on the market is
then equal to m = k. Assume that the rate of return on capital π is small enough to have
no impact on the decision by the owner to activate the firm. Then only the relative prices
between p and w matter.
Given an arbitrary pair of prices p and w we can determine the optimal size n(w, p) of the
firm by maximizing positional return on capital (with value added evaluated at price p) under
the worker-participation constraint (determined by wage w) as done before. Market supply
of the consumption good and market demand for labor then are given by Sc(w, p) = ms
n(w,p),






The consumer side of the market consists of a set of consumers C, each consumer i ∈ C
having an initial endowment ci ∈ R+ of the consumption good, li ∈ R+ units of time to
spend as leisure or labor supply in a firm, and preferences over leisure and the consumption
good represented by a utility function ui:R2+ → R. Assuming consumer preferences to satisfy
the standard regularity conditions, this yields market demand for the consumption good and
market supply of labor as functions of p and w. That determines consumer demand and
supply on markets, Dc(w, p) and Sl(w, p).
Confronting market supply and market demand at given prices p and w, there may exist
equilibrium prices p∗ and w∗, defined as follows.
Definition 5.1 A corporate equilibrium in a corporate market economy E is a pair of
prices (w, p) and a firm level n, such that:
1. The firm level n is the optimal firm level given prices (w, p), and
2. The prices p, w are competitive equilibrium prices at which market supply equals market
demand given firm level n.
Given the standard regularity assumptions on the set of consumers, a corporate market
equilibrium exists if n is continuous in prices22. For a firm with a linear production tech-
nology and αs ≥ e
1
2 a corporate market equilibrium thus exists since optimal firm level n
is continuous in p and w, see Section 4.2.1. If positional return on capital is positive at
the equilibrium output price and ϕn(fn) exceeds the equilibrium wage at n = 1, then these
equilibrium prices are also corporate market equilibrium prices, and the optimal firm level is
the firm level in the corporate market equilibrium. Otherwise, the firm level in a corporate
market equilibrium equals n = 0, and its prices are too low to activate the workers.
Determining equilibrium prices in case the production technology is a Cobb-Douglas tech-
nology with complementary labor inputs we only have to consider firm level n = 1 since that
22Since high reservation wages will only support small firm level it holds that n(w, p) → 0 if w
p
→ ∞. On
the other hand, low reservation wages result in large firm level since positional return on capital is increasing
in n for large enough n, and thus n(w, p)→∞ if wp → 0.
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is the optimal size for an active firm for all prices, see Section 4.2.2. In that case it is obvious
that n is continuous in p and w. If the participation constraints can be satisfied at n = 1,
then the equilibrium prices also are corporate market equilibrium prices, and n = 1 is the
corporate market equilibrium firm level. Otherwise, corporate market equilibrium firm level
equals n = 0, with corporate market equilibrium prices such that the workers do not want to
activate the firm.
Proposition 5.2 In a corporate market economy E = (F,C,M), where the technology of
the corporate firm is either a linear outcome function (with αs ≥ e
1
2 ), or a Cobb-Douglas
outcome function with non-increasing average labor productivity, the optimal firm level n∗ is
continuous in prices p and w.
As a consequence of this proposition we have that in a corporate market economy a
corporate market equilibrium exists if the firm is as described in Proposition 5.2. For in-
termediate cases of workers complementarity, however, corporate market equilibrium prices
need not exist since optimal firm level n is discontinuous in w. This discontinuity occurs if
positional return on capital (profit) of a firm with maximal level that can be supported by
the equilibrium wage is lower than the positional return on capital of a firm with level equal
to one. In the left picture of Figure 5 this is illustrated by a possible jump in firm level from
1 to nc(p).
The corporate market equilibrium concept generalizes upon the competitive equilibrium
concept if one assumes that the economy becomes transparent on the long run. In that case
the positional rents of cooperation within firms disappear and an overall Pareto efficiency is
obtained.
6 Related literature and concluding remarks
In this paper we presented a model which endogenously determines the optimal number
of echelons (called level) of a hierarchically structured firm with constant span of control.
This hybrid model has cooperative as well as noncooperative features. One of the main
novelties is the use of a cooperative pay-system which determines positional wages that may
be higher than reservation wages. This phenomenon also appears in efficiency wage theory
as discussed by, e.g., Stiglitz (1976), Akerlof (1984) and Yellen (1984). According to that
theory laborers should be paid a rent on their equilibrium wage in order to stimulate them
to put full effort in production and prevent them from shirking. A laborer losing its job or
position at equilibrium wages can easily find a new position on the same conditions. However,
paying rents on equilibrium wages makes it more difficult for laborers to find a new position
on the same conditions, viz., including the same positional rents. Moreover, paying rents on
equilibrium wages can induce unemployment which makes it even more difficult to find a new
position with this positional rent. In our model wages can be higher than the reservation
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wages of workers. The positional rent of a position, i.e., the difference between the wage of
a position and its reservation wage, can be compared to the rent of the efficiency wage.
Our model falls within new institutional economics which acknowledges that the neoclas-
sical model of a firm, although very useful, is not sufficient to fully understand what happens
inside and outside firms. We agree with Furutbotn (2001) that under bounded rationality
and transaction costs profit maximization in the neoclassical way is not possible and other
criteria have to be considered. In our model we assume a pay-system that assigns wages to
the different positions in the firm to be given, since bounded rationality or transaction costs
might prevent the employees to fully know their outside opportunities or have to make high
costs in switching jobs or renegotiating every time an improvement can be made. Obviously,
bounded rationality influences collective wage agreements and the resulting wages.
Our model also is in line with Rajan and Zingales (1998), who focus on the control of
access to a productive asset . This in contrast with the literature on incomplete contracts
which tries to explain the distribution of residual rights concerning the control over non-
contractable assets (see, e.g., Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990, 1999), and
Maskin and Tirole (1999)), and thus puts ownership of assets central. Similar as in our paper,
Rajan and Zingales (2001) try to explain firm formation focussing on the effects of agency
costs and benefits on the firm’s organization. They address the entrepreneurial problem of
enlisting the cooperation of many agents necessary for production without ceding to them
too much of the surplus generated by the enterprize. The tradeoff for the entrepreneur exists
in designing an organization that gives subordinated managers access to the critical resource
owned by the entrepreneur, without being expropriated by these managers. In our model,
the key is the internal pay-system which is based on a system of bargaining from bottom up.
The relation between asset ownership and relational contracts is studied in Baker, Gibbons
and Murphy (2002).
Assuming that production processes in innovative industries usually use more complemen-
tary labor, we showed that such an increase in complementarity leads to flatter hierarchies.
This is in line with Teece (1996) who studies the relation between firm structure and innova-
tion and concludes that firms strongly depending on innovation have correspondingly flatter
hierarchies.
Similar as in, e.g. DeCanio and Watkins (1998) and Garicano (2000), we neglect incen-
tive problems and assume that if an employee is active in a firm then he or she is ‘fully’
productive. As Beggs (2001) argues, in order to get more insight in the functioning of hier-
archical organizations it is best to focus on one of many aspects. In this sense these models
are complementary to the models which focus on incentive problems such as Qian (1994)
who endogenously determines the number of hierarchical echelons, the span of control and
the wage scales by using optimal control techniques, and in that way extends the seminal
work of Keren and Levhari (1979, 1983). Wage differences in our model arise not because of
incentives, but because of differences in the production technology, which is not the case in
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Qian (1994) who considers only one technology.
Since in our model of cooperative team production there is no uncertainty, issues like
information problems and moral hazard do not arise. In this sense our model is comple-
mentary to the literature on principal-agent theory and moral hazard (see, e.g., Holmström
(1979), Grossman and Hart (1983), Kessler (2000)). We can extend our model, for example
by introducing risk as done in Prescott and Townsend (2002) who study how risk sharing
can be a reason to form collective organizations by using principal-agent relations between
these organizations and outsiders. These models mainly use non-cooperative game theory
to study economic organizations in which binding agreements are not possible. Cooperative
game theory yields valuable tools when studying cooperative situations in which binding
agreements are possible. Recently, the use of cooperative game theory in analyzing economic
organizations gained attention. Rotschild (2001) uses a solution similar to the Shapley value
to determine the allocation of benefits among firms that form a cartel. Other applications can
be found in, e.g. Curiel (1988), Hamers (1995) who study sequencing situations, Maniquet
(2003) who studies queueing situations23, Ambec and Sprumont (2002) who study water dis-
tribution problems, and Graham, Marshall and Richard (1990) who study cooperation among
bidders in (English open bid and Second price sealed bid) auctions.
In the desciption of the firm we took the same approach as in Maskin, Qian and Xu (2000)
who state that an organization is a “hierarchy of managers built on top of technology” where
the technology is present in productive plants. However, since we assumed a constant span
of control, and in the organization structure of the firm only vary the number of echelons,
we do not study the organizational form of a hierarchy as done by Maskin, Qian and Xu
(2000) who compare an M-form (multidivisional form in which the organization goes along
institutional lines) with a U-form (unitary form in which the organization goes along regional
lines) with respect to their effectiveness in giving incentives to managers.
Beggs (2001) uses optimal control techniques to determine the optimal structure of hi-
erarchies when workers differ in the range of tasks they can perform. He studies how the
complexity of tasks influences organizational structure. He explains why many organizations
have a hierarchical structure by the economies of skilled workers. Skilled workers can make
decisions without consulting other workers, while unskilled workers need to ask (superior)
more skilled workers for advice or approval. Garicano (2000) develops a similar model in
which he uses specialization instead of differences in worker skills. He explains the formation
of hierarchies by a trade off between communication versus knowledge acquisition costs. In a
“knowledge-based hierarchy” easy problems are solved by lower (production) echelons, while
more exceptional or harder problems need to be passed on to higher echelons. Similar as in
our model, in his model the decision “who must learn what and whom each worker should
ask when confronted with an unknown problem” is part of the organization.
23The difference between these two models being the fact that in a sequencing situation the players or jobs
are already positioned in an initial order which is not the case for queueing situations.
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DeCanio and Watkins (1998) explain organizational structure from information process-
ing by describing an organization as a ‘pattern of information exchange among the agents’,
with an important role for the processing capabilities of the agents. Their conclusion that
‘flattening of organizations would be one result of improved information processing capabil-
ity of agents’ is in line with our model since high complementarity of front-workers usually
requires more skills than substitutable labor.
The friction between the internal cooperative behavior and the external competitive be-
havior is solved by accepting some imperfections in the labor markets and some hold up
features in human resource management. Baron and Kreps (1999) observe that the Human
Resource systems of successful firms, which systems are represented here by the firm’s inter-
nal organization, often display practices reinforcing consistent themes or messages. Radically
different Human Resource systems may exist because they face radically different external
forces, but they also can flourish reasonably well in very similar situations, if only they are
internally consistent. Consistency is obtained here because the organization is defined in
terms of positions or jobs, and is directly adapted to the production technology. Human re-
source management aims at matching the productivity requirements of the position or the job
with the productive capacities of the candidate to be employed. However, since the reward
system is determined by the positional or job-productivity rather than by the individual’s
productivity outside this context, the productivity of some person depends crucially on the
position in the firm’s organization. Due to cooperation, the organization will enhance the
productivity of that person drastically. Market wages on labor markets therefore refer to
the potential match of some individual person with the job-productivity that may result in
an organization, and are then assumed to correspond with that individual’s productivity.
Employment in the firm’s organization creates firm-specific assets or human capital, which
is controlled by the CEO. In the jargon of transaction cost economics, this feature of having
all assets controlled by a single entity is called unified governance.
There are several directions for further research. In a homogeneous firm as considered
in this paper the capacities of workers are identical. In a heterogeneous firm, workers and
coordinators are not necessarily identical and their capacities and tasks may vary from very
limited, such as routine work on a production line, to very sophisticated, such as work done
by a surgeon in a hospital. Heterogeneous outcome functions then allow for heterogeneous
organization structures, i.e., organization structures that do not necessarily have constant
span of control, and even are not necessarily tree structures. Our approach can also be
applied to such heterogeneous firms.
Secondly, the position pay-system as pay-system introduced here can be replaced by other
systems. We already mentioned in Section 2 that the results obtained there hold for all pay-
systems satisfying efficiency, vertical monotonicity and symmetry. Other examples of pay-
systems satisfying these properties are the egalitarian pay-system (which assigns the same
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wage to each employee position which is equal to the profit assigned to the owner position),
and every convex combination of this egalitarian pay-system and the position pay-system24.
Finally, it is relevant to know how strong both in the short run and in the long run the
internal cooperative forces are relative to the external competitive forces. The basic idea
is that cooperation improves productivity sufficiently such that the firm can afford a labor
cost above the reservation wage of labor at the lowest echelon. Or, said in another way,
unschooled and unemployed labor can be made more productive by and employable in a
firm with an adequate hierarchical internal organization. Further, labor in society is not
homogeneous, but has personal capacities that are traded on differentiated labor markets.
This heterogeneous labor interacts with the positions available in the internal organization
of firms. From a dynamic point of view, labor input with a substitutable character that
requires a deep firm organization in production, has incentives to transform in character
by schooling, differentiation or specialization and to become suited for flat organizations.
Concluding, we showed how technological change has an impact on the organization of firms
on a micro-economic level. Through the impact on wages this influences employment on a
macro-economic level, and therefore we showed how micro-economic forces should influence
macro-economic policy making.
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